There has been very little research to test whether ambiguity a¤ects individuals'decisions to insure themselves against the catastrophic e¤ects of climate change. This paper attempts to study how individuals respond to the availability of an insurance that would give them immunity to a climate change catastrophe. Moreover, if such an insurance is available to them, do they insure themselves su¢ ciently? Further, the study investigates the policy implications for insurance companies: does increased availability of information regarding the probability of the catastrophic event, lead to an increase in insurance subscriptions? Finally, policy implications for the State are investigated -Can State intervention ensure a better outcome?
Introduction
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1994), de…nes climate change as "a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods." The vast majority of scienti…c work on climate change has come to the conclusion that its e¤ect can already be seen in the form of a gradual but steady loss of sea ice, accelerated sea level rise and longer, more intense heat waves.
There exists a great deal of ambiguity surrounding climate change and the possibility that this climate change could at any point trigger a catastrophe, that would cause wide-scale damage. A climate change catastrophe can be viewed as a low-probability high-impact event. As such, the questions that need to be asked are: Given the ambiguity surrounding a catastrophic event taking place, are people su¢ ciently concerned in order to insure themselves against it? Moreover, if given the opportunity to protect themselves against such a catastrophe, do individuals su¢ ciently insure themselves?
There have been very few studies concerning individual behaviour regarding climate change. Most of the studies that have been conducted so far concentrate on whether communication, fairness and di¤erences in endowment levels, a¤ect how individuals coordinate to try and prevent climate change catastrophes. Milinski., Sommerfeld, Krambeck, Reed, and Marotzke (2008) , study a collective-risk social dilemma game where players attempt to coordinate in order to prevent dangerous climate change.
1 It was found that more than half the subjects that participated in the study, failed to coordinate on a required threshold that would prevent climate change. Inability to communicate with group members was seen as a reason for the coordination failure. Tavoni, Dannenberg, Kallis, and Löschel (2011) , study a similar game, where they attempt to embed an idea of inheritance or past wealth/debt among the players. Thus, "rich" players have a higher endowment than "poor" players.
Players were allowed to communicate, so that they could "pledge" their intentional contributions.
1 Subjects could observe the contribution levels of other players in their group.
The study found that the inequality introduced into the experimental setup made it harder for the players to coordinate, whereas the option of communicating improved the chances of coordination on the threshold. This paper combines experimental and theoretical research, that studies the e¤ects of ambiguity 2 on individuals' decisions to insure themselves against the catastrophic e¤ects of climate change and provides recommendations for private insurers and government policy. The study investigates individuals'behaviour when taking part in a game similar to the public goods game. Unlike a regular public goods game, where the objective is to create a gain, the objective of this game is to avoid a loss due to a climate change catastrophe. Subjects are given an endowment and warned that they might be the victim of a climate change catastrophe. The catastrophe which occurs with some unknown probability, would result in them losing their endowment. They can safeguard themselves against such a loss, by contributing as a group towards insurance. The insurance is bought if a threshold is reached and safeguards the team as a whole in the event of a catastrophe taking place.
Each subject's contribution towards attaining the insurance may be viewed as a strategic substitute for the others'. In the presence of ambiguity, if a player thinks that the others in his group would not contribute towards the public good, it should prompt him to increase his own contribution, in order to buy the insurance and avoid catastrophic climate change. It is thus possible to get a theoretical prediction of subject behaviour, given that there is a clear worst case scenariofailing to buy the insurance and su¤ering a loss due to catastrophic climate change. If it is found that individuals fail to su¢ ciently safeguard themselves, it might be because they do not regard the climate change catastrophe as very likely to a¤ect them -that is, they attach a very low probability to such an event happening. Another reason for this might be that they do not take into account the impact/magnitude that this catastrophe might have on them.
Storms, heat-waves, ‡oods and droughts are becoming more frequent as a result of climate change.
However, even with the increasing frequency of such high-impact events, it is found that people do 2 When a decision-maker fails to assign a subjective probability to an event, ambiguity arises.
not su¢ ciently insure themselves. It has been seen in the past that individuals discount the future to a great extent, and as such fail to make su¢ cient provisions for the future. 
Modelling Behaviour in the Presence of Ambiguity
The Ellsberg paradox is a well documented violation of the Subjective Expected Utility (SEU), Savage (1954) . Subjects asked to choose between risky and ambiguous acts, tend to avoid the ambiguous act. Such behaviour is inconsistent with maximising expected utility with respect to a standard subjective probability distribution : However these preferences are compatible with non-additive beliefs, introduced by Schmeidler (1989) . Non-additive beliefs may be represented by a capacity or non-additive set function . Under Choquet Expected Utility (CEU) (Schmeidler (1989) ), outcomes are evaluated by a weighted sum of utilities, but unlike EUT the weights used depend on the acts. The model preserves additivity in beliefs when there is conventional risk, while permitting non-additivity for ambiguous events. Within CEU individuals can be either optimistic or pessimistic in their outlook towards ambiguity. A pessimistic (resp. optimistic) outlook would over-estimate the likelihood of a bad (resp. good) outcome -inducing one to purchase a climate change catastrophe related insurance.
Neo-additive capacities were introduced by Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) . In this model the decision-maker has beliefs based on an additive probability distribution : However (s)he lacks con…dence in these beliefs hence they are ambiguous beliefs. The ambiguity is represented by the parameter : The individual's attitude to ambiguity is represented by the parameter ; with higher values of corresponding to greater ambiguity-aversion. Consider a two-player game with a …nite set of pure strategies S i ; such that s i is the player's own strategy and S i denotes the set of possible strategy pro…les for i's opponents. The payo¤ function of player i is denoted u i (s i ; s i ): The functional form of preferences may be represented as:
where
3 These preferences maximise a weighted average of the best payo¤, the worst payo¤ and the expected payo¤. They are a special case of CEU. They are also a special case of the -MEU model, Marinacci (2002) , which represents ambiguity by a set of probability distributions and ambiguity-attitude by the parameter expressing the weight given to the minimum possible expected utility.
Intuitively, can be thought to be the decision-maker's belief. However, he is not sure of this belief, hence it is an ambiguous belief. His con…dence about it is modelled by (1 i ); with i = 1 denoting complete ignorance and i = 0 denoting no ambiguity. His attitude to ambiguity is measured by i ; with i = 1 denoting pure pessimism and i = 0 denoting pure optimism. If the decisionmaker has 0 < i < 1; he is neither purely optimistic nor purely pessimistic (i.e., ambiguity-averse), but reacts to ambiguity in a partly pessimistic way by putting a greater weight on bad outcomes and in a partly optimistic way by putting a greater weight on good outcomes.
Modelling an Equilibrium under Ambiguity
In a Nash equilibrium, players are believed to behave in a manner that is consistent with the actual behaviour of their opponents. They perfectly anticipate the actions of their opponent and can thus 3 Note that Chateauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant (2007) write a neo additive capacity in the form (E) = + (1 ) (E): We have modi…ed their de…nition to be consistent with the majority of the literature where is the weight on the minimum expected utility.
provide a best response to it in the form of their own action. However, for non-additive beliefs, the Nash idea of having consistent beliefs regarding the opponent's action and thus being able to play a best response to these beliefs, needs to be modi…ed. It is assumed that players choose pure strategies. In equilibrium, a player's beliefs about the pure strategies of his/her opponent must be best responses for that opponent, given the opponent's beliefs.
Unlike Nash equilibrium where a player can assign an additive probability distribution to his/her opponent's actions, ambiguous beliefs are represented by capacities. The support of a capacity is a player's belief of how the opponent will act. Formally, the support of a neo-additive capacity,
, is de…ned by supp ( ) = supp ( ). Thus the support of a neo-additive belief is equal to the support of its additive component.
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De…nition 2.1 (Equilibrium under Ambiguity) A pair of neo-additive capacities
Equilibrium Under Ambiguity (EUA), for i = 1; 2 and supp ( i ) R i ( i ); where R i denotes the best-response correspondence of player i; given that his/her beliefs are represented by i and is de…ned by:
This de…nition of equilibrium is taken from Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper (2009) , who adapt an earlier de…nition in Dow and Werlang (1994) . These papers show that an EUA will exist for any given ambiguity-attitudes for the players. In games, one can determine i endogenously as the prediction of the players from the knowledge of the game structure and the preferences of others. In contrast, the degrees of optimism, i and ambiguity, i ; are treated as exogenous. In equilibrium, each player assigns a strictly positive likelihood to his/her opponent's best responses given the opponent's belief. However, each player lacks con…dence in his/her likelihood assessment and responds in an optimistic way by over-weighting the best outcome, or in a pessimistic way by over-weighting the worst outcome.
Alternative approaches to equilibrium with ambiguity can be found in Klibano¤ (1993) and Lo (1996) . They model players as having preferences which satisfy the axioms of maxmin expected utility (MMEU, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) ). Players are allowed to have beliefs which are represented by sets of conventional probability distributions. As such, players can have mixed strategies that are chosen from these sets of probabilities. They model ambiguity aversion as a strict preference among players to randomise between strategies when they are indi¤erent between two pure strategies.
Experimental Model and Equilibrium
The experimental setup consists of two players 5 , each given an endowment of 30ECU , who play …ve rounds. In each round a player had the choice of contributing between 0 4 ECU (they could make discrete contributions of 0; 1; 2; 3 or 4ECU ) with the aim of getting a total contribution of 20ECU , at the end of the …ve rounds. If at the end of the rounds, the players managed to reach the 20ECU threshold, they safeguarded themselves against the harmful impact of a climate change catastrophe.
If they failed to reach the threshold, a climate change catastrophe may have occurred with some unknown probability, and the players lost all their money.
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Subjects were randomly matched into groups of two, and remained in the same group throughout the experiment. Subjects were not allowed to communicate with each other and no information about intermediate contribution levels was made available to subjects between rounds. As such, subjects would perceive ambiguity from two sources -
1) The interaction with other players -which results in ambiguity about the other subjects'choice of contribution levels.
2) Ambiguity caused because of the unknown probability with which climate change catastrophe may or may not occur.
Nash equilibrium
The game has two symmetric pure strategy equilibria: One, where each player contributes a total of 10ECU over the …ve rounds (or 2ECU=round), the safety threshold is reached and each player has a guaranteed …nal payo¤ of 20ECU: Second, where each player contributes nothing each round, they fail to reach the threshold, and each has an expected payo¤ of 6ECU: 7 It is clearly optimal then for each player to contribute 10ECU over the …ve decision rounds, which makes this the more e¢ cient equilibrium strategy.
Equilibrium under Ambiguity
Consider Player 1. Suppose she holds beliefs which are represented by a neo-additive capacity:
v(Aj ; ; ) = + (1 ) (A): Given these beliefs Player 1's Choquet expected utility (CEU) from the choice of n 1 is:
The ine¢ cient Nash, where players contribute 0ECU per round and fail to reach the safety threshold, is ignored.
If Player 1 contributes 2ECU per round: The maximum payo¤ she earns if the threshold is reached, is 20ECU . Else, if the threshold is not reached and the climate change catastrophe occurs, she earns 0ECU: Let the probability with which Player 2 contributes 2ECU per round be~ 2 : The CEU of Player 1 from contributing 2ECU per round can be computed as: secure payo¤ of 10ECU: The CEU of Player 1 from contributing 4ECU per round is thus:V 1 = 10:
Player 1 will prefer to contribute 4ECU per round if:
Based on Player 1's belief of~ 2 ;V 1 is strictly preferred if:
Thus, if Player 1 is su¢ ciently ambiguous about Player 2's contributions, she should contribute 4ECU per round, in order to ensure that the threshold is reached. The EUA for Player 2 is symmetric to that of Player 1. He should also contribute 4ECU per round if he is ambiguous about the safety threshold being reached.
The testable hypothesis is that though Nash equilibrium predicts subjects should contribute 2ECU per round or 10ECU in total, EUA suggests that subjects who are ambiguity-averse would contribute more (3=4ECU ) per round in order to ensure the safety threshold is reached.
Experimental Design
The experiments were coded using z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007) ). Four treatments were employed as underTreatment I -This is the base treatment, where subjects were informed that the catastrophe will occur with an unknown probability and they must coordinate with the team-member (one other person), in order to buy the climate change insurance.
All subsequent treatments were variations of Treatment I as below:
Treatment II -In this treatment, subjects were informed "In the past few periods, climate change catastrophes are known to have struck at least 80% of the time." Thus, subjects are given additional information about the probability with which catastrophes have occurred in the past. It is important to note here that the probability with which the catastrophic event takes place in the current period is an independent event, whose probability is still ambiguous. The aim of this treatment is to check whether educating/informing subjects about the frequency of the catastrophe in the past leads to an increase in the insurance contributions.
Treatment III -In this treatment, subjects were informed that they "have been assigned to a team, where a computer is the other player. The computer you are teamed with, has been programmed to contribute 2ECU=round. Do not expect it to deviate from this strategy." Thus, this treatment removes the strategic uncertainty involved in coordinating with another player. This treatment strictly captures the ambiguity-averse reaction to the climate change event. If subjects are not ambiguity-averse to the climate event, they should contribute 0ECU .
Treatment IV -In this treatment, subjects were informed that "The government has taken into account the grave losses that might occur as a result of a climate change catastrophe. As such, with your best interests at heart, all players are pre-assigned to a 2ECU /round level of contribution towards the insurance. If you are unhappy with this pre-assigned contribution level, you can change your contribution, but will need to con…rm this decision by answering a simple mathematics question." Thus, all subjects are "pre-assigned" to a contribution level. If subjects are dissatis…ed with this automatic assignment, they needed to take conscious (and concrete) steps to opt o¤ it. As such, subjects could not opt o¤ as a result of a "tremble". The pre-assigned contribution level, is the contribution level predicted by the Nash equilibrium. The aim of choosing the solution predicted by the Nash equilibrium was to evaluate how people react in a situation where a Nash equilibrium pre-existed (i.e., do people deviate from a pre-existing Nash equilibrium?).
The experimental sessions were conducted at the Finance and Economics Experimental Laboratory in Exeter (FEELE), UK between October 2015 and May 2016. In total 719 subjects took part in the experiments, 319 of whom were male and the remaining 400 were female. The breakdown of subjects between treatments were as follows: Treatment I -180 subjects, Treatment II -192 subjects, Treatment III -153 subjects and Treatment IV -194 subjects. Each session lasted a maximum of 45 minutes including payment.
Subjects …rst read through a short, comprehensive set of instructions at their own pace. 8 The subjects were then asked to …ll out practice questions to check that they understood the games correctly. Subjects could not proceed to the main experiment until they had correctly answered the practice questions. As such, if subjects were unable to answer a question correctly, they were assisted and their doubt/query resolved before they proceeded to take part in the main experiment. Subjects were randomly assigned to groups of two (except Treatment III, where they were paired with the computer), and remained in the same group for the rest of the experiment.
The experiment was "framed", explicitly mentioning a climate change catastrophe, and the provision threshold of 20ECU was common knowledge among the participants. In each round, subjects had to make a decision about how much to contribute (between 0 4ECU ) towards the group insurance. Each subject could only select one option per round. In Treatment IV, subjects were pre-assigned to a contribution of 2ECU per round, and had to solve a simple mathematics question correctly in order to deviate from the pre-assigned selection. Participants were not reminded about their own previous cumulative contributions.
Subjects could not communicate with each other during the experiment. Moreover, they received no information about their team member's contribution decisions between rounds -therefore, there was no opportunity to update one's beliefs.
Once subjects had made all decisions, the result screen informed subjects about how much the group contribution towards the insurance had been and whether the insurance had been purchased.
There was no reimbursement of contributions, if the threshold was not reached or if surplus contributions were made to the insurance. The computer used a random algorithm to simulate whether or not the climate change catastrophe had occurred, and calculated the …nal payo¤ in ECU and 8 The experimental protocols are available here: http://saraleroux.weebly.com/experimental-protocols.html GBP , for each subject. Subjects were paid a show-up fee of $3, together with their earnings, where 5ECU = $1: 9 Average payo¤s per treatments were as follows: Treatment I -$5:50, Treatment II -$6, Treatment III -$6:40 and Treatment IV -$5:50:
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Data Analysis and Discussion
Observed subject behaviour in the experiments, on the whole, suggested that subjects were indeed concerned about the losses that could be caused by a climate change catastrophe. Table 1 , shows the number of groups that successfully reached the required threshold and safeguarded themselves against the climate change catastrophe. Binomial tests were run to ascertain whether the number of groups reaching the threshold in each treatment was signi…cantly more than the number of groups that failed to reach the threshold. Table 2 shows that null was rejected at a 1% signi…cance level overall and for Treatments I, II and III, and at a 5% signi…cance level for Treatment IV. .4825*** *, **, *** indicate signi…cance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Only 19 (2:64%) out of the total 719 subjects that took part in the experiments contributed nothing towards buying the insurance (i.e., 0ECU in each round). It was found that there were only 9 Participants'show-up fee was not a¤ected by the climate change catastrophe. 10 Payo¤s were round up to the nearest 20p; for the purpose of payment. 2 (0:28%) subjects who were ambiguity-averse enough to contribute 4ECU each round. 11 Table 3 classi…es subjects according to their total contribution towards purchasing the insurance. Subjects contributing less than 10ECU fall in Group A, subjects contributing exactly 10ECU (or the contribution level predicted by the e¢ cient Nash) fall in Group B, and subjects contributing more than 10ECU (or those conforming with the Equilibrium under Ambiguity prediction) fall in Group C.
In Treatment I (the base treatment), two-thirds of the groups (60 groups) successfully purchased the insurance. This shows us that subjects are indeed concerned about climate change catastrophes and their impact. When given the opportunity to insure themselves, subjects tend to do so. From Table 3 , one can note that approximately 21% of subjects (Group A) have a tendency to free-ride; about half of them (Group B) attempted to coordinate in order to achieve the more e¢ cient Nash, and about 26% (Group C) contributed more towards the insurance, as predicted by the EUA. It is clear that a majority of subjects conform to the e¢ cient Nash prediction, however, a signi…cant number of subjects contribute more than predicted by Nash. Another factor that could be a¤ecting the decision of subjects that fall in Group C (in Treatment I), may be weak altruism (Wilson (1990) ).
As such, subjects willingly bear the burden of purchasing the insurance on their own, in order to safeguard the team as a whole.
In Treatment II, subjects were given more information regarding the frequency with which the catastrophe had occurred in the past. Subjects were found to take this additional information on board, and this results in an increase in the number of groups that successfully purchase the insurance to 79:17% (76 groups). A Fisher exact test 12 shows that there is a signi…cant increase in the number of groups purchasing the insurance, when compared to the base treatment (P = 0:069):
As such, if individuals are given more information about the growing frequency of climate change catastrophes, they update their beliefs and successfully insure themselves. The policy implications of this for insurance companies is that, if they provide better information to customers about the damage caused by climate change catastrophes, their insurance subscriptions would increase.
In Treatment III, the strategic uncertainty of coordinating with another player was removed.
Subjects were paired with a computer, programmed to contribute 2ECU: From the data, it can be seen that 81:05% (124 subjects) successfully reached the required threshold -i.e., when strategic uncertainty was removed, the number of subjects purchasing the insurance increased. When compared to the base treatment, a Fisher exact test 13 shows that there is a signi…cant di¤erence in the number of subjects purchasing the insurance in Treatment III (P = 0:014): In this treatment, if subjects
are not concerned about the climate change catastrophe, they should contribute 0ECU: The data gathered in the experiments, …nds that 6 subjects contributed 0ECU towards the insurance, in this treatment. Thus a small minority (3:92%) of subjects did not …nd the catastrophe a matter of concern. In this treatment, it is ine¢ cient to contribute both more and less than 10ECU , since the computer is guaranteed to contribute the remaining. There were 27 subjects who contributed more than 10ECU; and 23 subjects who made a positive contribution (i.e., greater than 0ECU ) but not enough to reach the threshold.
In Treatment IV, subjects were pre-assigned to a contribution level of 2ECU by a "benevolent"
Government. It was found that the number of groups successfully purchasing the insurance (58:76%;
i.e., 57 groups) was lower than in the base treatment. It is very interesting to note that Government intervention or the "nudge" seems to have back…red -i.e., subjects exerted an e¤ort to opt-o¤ the pre-assigned contribution level. A Fisher exact test 14 …nds no di¤erence between Treatments I and IV (P = 0:292), re ‡ecting that the "nudge" was not successful in a¤ecting people's behaviour or that it 13 (H 0 :The proportion of groups buying insurance in T I and T III are indentical, H 1 :The proportion of groups buying insurance in T I and T III are not identical)
14 (H 0 :The proportion of groups buying insurance in T I and T IV are indentical, H 1 :The proportion of groups buying insurance in T I and T IV are not identical) may have even caused a "rebellious" behaviour on the part of subjects. This is termed a "boomerang e¤ect" in psychology, where an attempt to persuade a subject, results in the unintended consequence of him/her adopting an opposing position instead (Brehm and Brehm (1981) ). In particular, 53 (27%) subjects exerted the extra e¤ort required to reduce their contribution level. Interestingly, 45 (23%) subjects exerted the extra e¤ort required in order to increase their contribution levels.
These subjects display that they are willingly to contribute more than the standard State-required contribution level in order to avoid ambiguous losses. About 50% of the subjects (96 subjects) remained at the "State-determined" pre-assigned contribution level.
The standard Ellsberg (1961) urn question was posed to the subjects, in order to determine their ambiguity-attitude.
15 Dummy variables were de…ned for the various treatments (T reatment I;
T reatment II, etc.) and to capture subjects'ambiguity-attitude (Ambiguity Averse=Ambiguity Seeking). A probit regression was run to ascertain what factors increased the likelihood of the insurance being bought.
A probit regression of "Bought" on the various treatment and ambiguity-attitude dummies has a chi-square ratio of 36:55 with a p-value of 0:0000; which shows that our model as a whole is statistically signi…cant. 16 Regression results are seen below. Ambiguity-averse subjects should choose to bet on balls labelled X, as their quantity is known. Ambiguity-seeking subjects would choose to bet on balls labelled Y , whose quantity is unknown. (The question was not incentivised.) 16 The dummy for Treatment I and Ambiguity-seeking attitude were dropped from the probit regression, in order to avoid the problem of collinearity. Dummies for mathematical ability, risk-attitude and gender were found to be insigni…cant, and were thus dropped from the …nal regression. 17 The coe¢ cients from a probit regression do not have the same interpretation as coe¢ cients from an Ordinary Least Squares regression. From the probit results, we can interpret that when in Treatment II: the z-score increases by 0:38; in Treatment III: the z-score increases by 0:43; in Treatment IV: the z-score decreases by 0:219; when compared to the base which is Treatment I. Moreover, if a subject is ambiguity-averse (s)he is more likely to purchase the insurance.
There was no signi…cant di¤erence between Treatments I and IV. However, for Treatments II and III; subjects purchased the insurance signi…cantly more often than in Treatment I. Moreover, if a subject displays ambiguity in the classic Ellsberg urn situation, they are signi…cantly more likely to purchase the insurance.
Conclusion
It was found that on the whole, a majority of subjects do reach the threshold required to insure themselves against the climate change catastrophe. Removing the strategic uncertainty of contribution towards the insurance (Treatment III) and increasing the information about the frequency of climate change catastrophes that have occurred in the past (Treatment II), leads to a signi…cant increase in insurance subscriptions. Interestingly, a State intervention or a "nudge" does not have the intended e¤ects. State intervention was in fact counter-productive, and may have resulted in a fall in subscriptions.
A majority of the subjects'behaviour was consistent with Nash predictions, however, a sizable minority did display behaviour consistent with an ambiguity-averse attitude. It is important to note that it is easier to coordinate on the Nash equilibrium, when the group consists of two people.
Increasing the group size beyond two, might result in failures in coordination and/or increase in contributions fuelled by ambiguity-averse behaviour (since strategic ambiguity can be seen to increase with group-size).
Overall, it was found that individuals are increasingly concerned about climate change and the resultant impact it is having on our every day lives. As such, there may be scope for insurance companies to o¤er insurances tailored speci…cally to cover climate-change related catastrophes. An insurance of this type would require a widespread up-take, for it to be feasible from the insurance companies'point of view. Unless individuals perceived to live in "high-risk" areas, are cross-insured by individuals living in "lower-risk" areas, insurance companies would …nd that all their customers were "lemons" and would quickly go out of business.
In future investigations, it might be interesting to ascertain whether subjects who failed to reach the threshold and lost their endowment as a result of the catastrophe "occurring", behave di¤erently if they are asked to play the game again. This would be an extension of Treatment II, since subjects will have experienced …rst-hand the damage caused by failing to secure the insurance. In reality, insurance premiums would increase to re ‡ect the growing frequency of the catastrophe. As such, it would be interesting to see whether subjects are willing to pay more to buy an insurance, which they had failed to purchase previously at a lower price. The key idea here is to investigate whether experiencing a low-probability high-impact event can change the ambiguity-attitude of a subject.
Climate change and its allied e¤ects are becoming inevitable, as such, greater measures need to be put in place to safeguard individuals'interests. In this study, indirect state interventions or nudges, were found to be ine¤ective in the climate change context. As such, further investigations may be needed to ascertain more direct mechanisms that would ensure a better outcome.
